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JOHN LOCKE IN THE GERMAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT: AN INTERPRETATION 
BY KLAUS P. FISCHER 
I. A favorite assumption of Anglo-American scholarship, endlessly 
repeated in textbooks and monographs, is that Locke's philosophy 
triumphed in every nook and cranny of Western Europe. By im- 
plication, it is also assumed that other philosophic systems, especially 
those of Descartes and Leibniz, withered away without much op- 
position. The reigning philosophy of the Enlightenment, we are told, 
was that of Locke and his disciples in England and on the Continent. 
Some have gone so far as to claim that Locke's "influence pervades the 
eighteenth century with an almost scriptural authority."' 
Examining the philosophic traditions of individual nations in 
eighteenth-century Europe, one encounters a slightly different picture. 
Taking the German Enlightenment as an example, this essay is meant 
to dispute, if not destroy, the exaggerated importance ascribed to John 
Locke in eighteenth-century Europe. 
In France Locke faced the formidable Cartesian system; in 
Germany he encountered an almost insurmountable obstacle in the 
Leibniz-Wolff school.2 It has been observed that in Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646-1716) the Germans had a Newton and a Locke rolled 
into one-that is to say, Leibniz was at once a great scientist and a 
philosopher.3 He was the father of German philosophy as surely as Des- 
cartes was the founder of French philosophy. He was not only aperpet- 
uum mobile of science, but the true preceptor of the German nation. 
Every foreign philosophy, therefore, had to reckon with the authority of 
Leibniz, and after his death with that of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), 
who endowed Leibniz's thought with the esprit de systeme. The Leibniz- 
Wolff school exercised an almost iron grip on German philosophy from 
1680-1750.4 This success was due, in large part, to Wolff's pedagogic 
skill in systematizing Leibnizian doctrines; in doing this, Wolff at once 
satisfied the deep urge of the German mind for order and the scholastic 
'Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century 
(New York, 1929), 16. 
2Aram Vartanian, in his brilliant work, Diderot and Descartes, has demonstrated 
the persistent influence of Descartes in the French Enlightenment. Much credit is due 
him for modifying the exaggerated view of Locke's importance in eighteenth-century 
France. 
3A. Wolfstieg, "Englischer und Franz6sischer Deismus und die Deutsche Auf- 
klarung," Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft, 17 (May 1908), 145. 
4For the triumph of the Wolffians in the German universities: Max Wundt, Die 
deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der A ufkldrung (Tiibingen, 1945). 
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tenor of German philosophy. The results were amazing: Wolffs fame 
spread like wildfire and his disciples captured most university positions 
in Germany. According to one source, there were 231 literary figures in 
1738 who officially acknowledged Wolff as their preceptor.5 
Wolff expounded an abstract rationalism that soon pervaded other 
fields besides philosophy. The literary counterpart to Wolff, for 
example, was Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-66), whose influence 
equalled-perhaps even surpassed-that of Wolff. Not until both men 
passed from the scene in the late 1750's could any rival mode of thought 
hope to win the allegiance of German philosophers or men of letters. 
There was, of course, some opposition to Wolffianism during its he- 
gemony from 1720-50. This opposition emanated from Christian 
Thomasius (1655-1728) and his followers. Thomasius developed an em- 
pirical theory of knowledge loosely similar to that of Locke. This re- 
semblance has caused considerable speculation about Thomasius' in- 
debtedness to his English counterpart.6 Since both thinkers wrote at 
about the same time, this question of "influence" may never be settled 
conclusively. One fact, however, seems fairly certain: Locke's common 
sense temper, especially in religion, seems to have prompted Thoma- 
sius to return to his earlier position of secular empiricism-a position 
from which he had been temporarily deflected by Pietism.7 Thomasius 
always spoke approvingly of Locke's philosophy, whose secular and 
empirical tenor reinforced his own philosophic outlook. He was by 
nature a rebellious spirit, eager to eradicate the remnants of scholas- 
ticism and to provide knowledge with a purely secular and empirical 
basis. In practice, however, he was not able to remove all the vestiges of 
tradition; and, like Luther's, his reforming spirit often veiled a stubborn 
streak of conservatism. This was most apparent in his moral 
philosophy, radically different from Locke's eudaemonistic-utilitarian 
ethics. It is well to recall that Thomasius lived in a different social 
milieu than Locke's. German thinkers, bound by encrusted medieval 
socio-economic conditions, still accepted moral values which the 
English had already outgrown: avoidance of risks and excessive profits, 
rejection of competition and self-advancement, and abstention from 
social or political aspirations. A parade of German moralists, including 
SQuoted by Carl Justi, Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen (Leipzig, 1923), I, 78. 
6The similarity between Thomasius and Locke is noted briefly by Walter Bienert, 
Die Philosophie des Christian Thomasius (Halle, 1934), 11; Cay von Brockdorff, Die 
Deutsche Aufkldrungs-Philosophie (Munich, 1926), 42; Gustav Zart, Einfluss der en- 
glischen Philosophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts 
(Berlin, 1881), Pt. 3, Ch. 1; Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der 
Aufkldrung (Tiibingen, 1945), 31-32; and Erik Wolf, Grosse Rechtsdenker der deuts- 
chen Geistesgeschichte (TiUbingen, 1939), 329. 
7Thomasius' return to a more temperate and rationalistic religion came after he 
read Locke's chapter on "Enthusiasm" (IV, 19), added to the fourth edition of the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1700). 
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Thomasius, continued to propound ethical systems based on altruistic 
love, stoic isolation, and psychological quietude.8 
Brought up in a backward social environment characterized by re- 
ligious superstition, political repression, and economic stagnation, 
Thomasius could not be expected to embrace modernity in quite the 
same way in which his English counterpart Locke pursued it. His moral 
and political ideas, reflecting German conditions, differ markedly from 
those of Locke. In his political philosophy, for example, Thomasius was 
a proponent of "enlightened absolutism." The ideal of constitutional 
government, which he thought incompatible with man's corrupt nature, 
he classified under "sick forms of government."9 
It would be misleading, however, to single out the traditionalism of 
German society as the only obstacle to Lockean ideas. Thomasius was 
not the best spokesman for Locke's philosophy. He was by profession a 
jurist and pursued philosophical problems only as an avocation. His 
philosophical treatises were little more than practical manuals, de- 
signed to turn young gentlemen into civilized human beings. Compared 
to Wolffs imposing tomes, the works of Thomasius appear pathetically 
slender. In place of magnificent categories, divisions, and subdivisions, 
Thomasius offered a few common sense maxims (Handgriffe). In 
choosing this popular manner of exposition, he committed a serious 
tactical error: by side-stepping all philosophical complexities, he lost 
his opportunity to establish an academic tradition that might have been 
able to compete with the reigning school of abstract rationalism. As it 
was, his empiricism hardly made a ripple in the vast sea of German ra- 
tionalism. In eighteenth-century Germany, we must remember, the 
success or failure of a philosophic system depended largely on three 
factors: the influence of its author in the academic community, the 
manner of its exposition, and the quality of its disciples. Thomasius' 
philosophy failed on all three counts. The academic world, still 
thoroughly scholastic and traditional, regarded him as a bete noire be- 
cause he had nothing but contempt for its traditional assumptions.10 
His popular and eclectic treatment of ideas was also bound to be 
ineffective in a scholarly community which prized the "spirit of 
thoroughness" (Geist der Grundlichkeit, as Kant called it). As to 
Thomasius' followers, they were epigoni, who exercised little influence 
on German thought. Thomasius' students generally swelled the ranks 
of the obedient civil servants and became cautious legalists. Only a few 
followers of Thomasius, such as Johann Franz Buddeus (1667-1729), 
8The best treatment of this moral dimension in the German Enlightenment may be 
found in Hans M. Wolff, Die Weltanschauung der deutschen Aufkliirung in Ges- 
chichtlicher Entwicklung (Berne, 1963). 
9For a fine discussion of Thomasius' political philosophy: F. M. Barnard, "The 
Practical Philosophy of Christian Thomasius," JHI, 32 (April-June 1971), 221-46. 
l'Walter Bienert (Die Philosophie des Christian Thomasius, 74) observes that an 
"icy silence" descended upon Thomasius' thought after his death. 
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Nicholaus Hieronymus Gundling (1671-1729), Andreas Ridiger (1673- 
1731), and Christian August Crusius (1715-75), pursued an academic 
career. These men, however, were utterly ineffective in stemming the 
tide of Wolffianism. In spite of some efforts to combat Wolffianism, the 
number of the Thomasians declined as that of the Wolffians rose. By 
1740, at the height of Wolff's power, the Thomasians have practically 
disappeared and their textbooks have been forgotten.1 
It was among the Thomasians, then, that Lockean ideas were for 
the first time seriously studied in Germany. The weakness of the Thom- 
asian opposition to Wolff, however, made it very difficult for Locke to 
get a fair hearing. Locke's first appearance in Germany, therefore, 
passed largely unnoticed. From 1704 to 1754 (from the death of Locke 
to the death of Wolff) Locke was a quiet subterranean force in German 
philosophy, overshadowed by the Leibniz-Wolff school. 
II. In the 1740's and 1750's the rationalistic systems of Wolff and 
Gottsched experienced their first setbacks. Under the influence of 
Pietism, English empiricism, and middle-class sentimentality 
(Empfindsamkeit), latent dissatisfaction with abstract rationalism now 
broke out into the open. The rationalistic mode of thought was 
challenged from several points of view by Germany's poets, 
philosophers, and artists. 
The first, and perhaps the most serious, attack against Wolff took 
place within the Berlin Academy.12 Founded by Leibniz, who also 
served as its first president, the Berlin Academy had reached the 
heights of prestige and effectiveness under Frederick the Great. From 
the beginning, Frederick hoped that the Wolffians and Newtonians 
could be made to cooperate within the Academy.13 He was sadly disap- 
pointed. When the famous French scientist Pierre-Louis Moreau de 
Maupertuis (1698-1759), a Newtonian and a sworn enemy of Wolff, be- 
came president of the Academy the battle between English philosophy 
and German philosophy was joined. On the Newtonian (Lockean) side 
were ranged Maupertuis, Leonhard Euler (1707-83), and Johann Hein- 
rich Lambert (1728-77); on the Wolffian side the most important men 
were George Sulzer (1720-79), Samuel Formey (1711-97), and Johann 
Philipp Heinius (d. 1775).14 
"Gustav Zart, Einfluss der englischen Philosophen seit Bacon auf die deutsche 
Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1881), 60. 
12For an excellent account of the prolonged and bitter controversy between the 
Wolffians and the Newtonians in the Berlin Academy: Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der 
Koniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Vol. I, Bk. 2, Ch. 2 
(Berlin, 1900). There is also a fine article on the Newton-Wolff controversy by Ronald 
S. Calinger, "The Newtonian-Wolffian controversy, 1740-1759," JHI, 30 (July-Sept. 
1969), 319-30. 
3Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie, I, 254. 
14Though Euler and Lambert were ranged on the Newtonian side, it must not be in- 
ferred from this that they were also Lockeans. Both men displayed a readiness to ap- 
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The year 1747 marked the opening engagement. In that year, the 
Academy posed, as the subject of its annual prize essay, the question 
whether monads had a foundation in reality.15 The decision went 
against Wolff when the first prize was awarded to a relatively unknown 
legal scholar, who had delivered a scathing critique of monads. A much 
more serious battle, this time involving the prestige of Leibniz himself, 
broke out in 1751. The chief protagonists were Samuel Konig, a leading 
Dutch mathematician, and Maupertuis. Konig submitted a manuscript 
in which he criticized the "Principe de la moindre action," a principle 
Maupertuis claimed to have discovered. Not only did Konig prove that 
Maupertuis' principle-as he stated it-was erroneous, but also that 
Leibniz had already discovered the correct principle. It was especially 
the assertion that he had been anticipated by Leibniz that infuriated 
Maupertuis, and he demanded documentation. Konig, however, 
possessed only a copy of Leibniz's statement and was unable to produce 
the original. The Academy, asked to judge the case, took Maupertuis' 
side, declaring Konig's copied letter a forgery.16 Things, of course, did 
not rest here. Voltaire subsequently entered the fray against 
Maupertuis, and the episode ended with inconclusive results, though it 
proved, if anything, that very great men could make great fools of 
themselves. 
The significance of these struggles in terms of the Lockean 
philosophy, however, was far ranging. Wolff's prestige was seriously 
questioned within and without the Academy. But as long as Maupertuis 
was president (1746-59) the Newtonians had the upper hand; and this 
domination continued as long as the foreign element held the reins of 
power. 
The Wolffian system, then, was subjected to prolonged and inten- 
sive critiques in the 1750's and 1760's. Even the most faithful disciples 
of Wolff, most notably Alexander Baumgarten (1714-62), G. F. Meier 
(1718-77), and Martin Knutzen (1720-56), began to transform their 
preciate sense phenomena, but retained a great deal of their Leibniz-Wolff heritage. In 
some ways they advanced beyond either Locke or Leibniz to Kant's point of view. Both 
attacked Wolff in the Academy for his views on natural science, not for his other philo- 
sophic efforts. 
'5The exact text of the 1747 question reads as follows: "On demande, qu'en com- 
mencant par exposer d'une maniere exacte et nette la doctrine des Monades, on 
examine si d'un c6te elles peuvent etre solidement refutees et detruites par des argu- 
ments sans replique; ou si de l'autre on est en etat, apres avoir prouve les Monades, d'en 
d6duire une explication intelligible des principaux phenomenes de l'Univers, et en parti- 
culier de l'origine et du mouvement des corps." 
'6Maupertuis' behavior made a very unfavorable impression on the Academy. To 
judge as a forgery a letter it had never seen in the original is not exactly sound scientific 
procedure. Maupertuis' victory was pyrrhic: apart from arousing the ire of the 
Leibnizeans within and without the Academy, Maupertuis soon had to reckon with 
Voltaire, who devastated him with his polemical prowess. 
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master's system by laying greater emphasis on its empirical and 
practical aspects. Wolff himself had always insisted that philosophy 
must not be separated from the practical world, and he had followed up 
this conviction by paying due respect to empirical elements in his 
psychology and epistemology. This explains why his rationalism ap- 
peared as two-dimensional.17 All objects, Wolff said, should be viewed 
in terms of immutable as well as of probable truths-that is to say, for 
each field of reality there exists a knowledge of metaphysical concepts 
and of empirical facts. The two dimensions were to complement each 
other, though Wolff clearly thought the metaphysical of greater va- 
lidity. Still, he was never tired of repeating that there are two ways of 
knowing: by experience and by reason. In psychology, for example, we 
must proceed in two ways, using a rationalistic psychology to discover 
the metaphysical concepts of the soul and an empirical psychology to 
prove their factuality. 
In practice, Wolff was unable to maintain a radical dualism of two 
separate ways of knowing.18 The result of his endeavor to develop a ra- 
tionalistic epistemology based on empirical foundations was that his ra- 
tionalism was frequently at odds with his empiricism. This was most 
notorious in his psychology, and proved to be a source of embarrass- 
ment to his disciples. 
These weaknesses were noted by Wolff's opponents, who promptly 
exploited the concessions he had made to empiricism. In the 1760's his 
system was slowly transformed into a kind of popular eclecticism.'1 
The following developments contributed toward the dilution of 
Wolffian rationalism: (1) his rationalistic epistemology became 
overshadowed by the concessions he had made to empiricism, (2) his 
scholastic mode of philosophizing was abandoned in favor of more in- 
formal modes of argumentation, and (3) his rigorous analytic-synthetic 
method was replaced by one of common sense or "sound reasoning." 
III. The breakdown of Wolffian rationalism gave Locke a new, 
though not a permanent, lease on life in Germany. For approximately 
two decades (1755-75) a group of men, generally referred to as Popular 
Philosophers (Popularphilosophen), embraced distinctly empirical 
modes of thought. They admired Locke's reasonableness, his emphasis 
on sense experience, and his informal style of philosophizing. Their 
ideal, perhaps best expressed in J. J. Engel's work, "Der Philosoph fur 
die Welt," was the gentleman scholar who wrote philosophy during his 
"idle and heavy hours." These "philosophers of the world" believed in 
man's reasonableness and his eventual perfection. They taught their 
generation that this is the best of all possible worlds, that reason will 
17Wilhelm Windelband, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (TUbingen, 1957), 
395. 
18Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, Kant and his Predecessors 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 267. 
'9Gustav Zart, Einfluss der Englischen Philosophen, op. cit., 72. 
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gradually conquer superstition and ignorance, and that God has 
ordered the world in such a way as to increase happiness among all 
righteous men. It was a naive and, at times, trivial credo which the 
Popular Philosophers taught.20 
Locke's ideas, then, were studied with renewed interest around mid- 
century by a group of litterateurs known as Popular Philosophers. His 
religious ideas were taken up by a group within Popular Philosophy 
which is often called Neologian, while his educational theories were 
greatly admired by that party within Popular Philosophy which styled 
itself "Philanthropinist." Finally, some of his ideas influenced a third 
party within Popular Philosophy-the so-called German empiricists. 
Though Locke was studied with great interest by these men, and was 
often cited approvingly, there is no evidence to suggest that the Popular 
Philosophers were Lockean. 
The neological movement, comprising such figures as Johann 
Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (1709-89), August Friedrich Wilhelm 
Sack (1703-86), Joachim Spalding (1714-1804), Gotthilf Samuel Stein- 
bart (1738-1800), and Johann August Eberhard (1739-1809), was at 
one with Locke on the simplicity, reasonableness, and, above all, hu- 
maneness of Christianity. The Neologians also shared Locke's aversion 
to dogmatic systems. At the same time, practically all Neologians dis- 
liked Locke's overly rationalistic theology, and rightly perceived that it 
would lead to a sterile and impersonal deism. The Neologians were 
greatly influenced by the emotional tenor of German Pietism, a 
theological cast of mind which Locke would have rejected as another 
variety of "enthusiasm." Jerusalem and the German Neologians 
believed that religion was essentially a private experience-subjectively 
felt rather than objectively demonstrated. There is a sustained tone of 
enthusiasm and emotional fervor in German Neology which is conspic- 
uously absent in Locke. Compared to Jerusalem, Sack, or Spalding, 
Locke's theology exudes the rational spirit of the banking house. Where 
Locke, in Leslie Stephen's words, "plods steadily through the Gospels 
and the Acts, accumulating proof after proof,"21 the Neologians appeal 
steadily to the heart, to the beauty and harmony of nature, and to the 
certainty of subjective feeling. 
The Neologians, then, shared some ideas with Locke, but went be- 
yond Lockean rationalism to a more introspective theology. Beginning 
in the 1740's, and reaching its fruition in the last quarter of the century, 
German theology and philosophy became increasingly subjective and 
20Many German historians have seized upon the shallow doctrines of the Popular 
Philosophers to condemn the whole Aufklirung as trivial. The Popular Philosophers 
were indeed trivial, but they do not represent the A ufklirung as a whole. To condemn 
the whole movement as "seicht" or "banausich" is to condemn Lessing, Wieland, 
Winckelmann, and Kant as trivial-judgments surely no one would wish to make. 
21 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (New York, 
1962), I, 80. 
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transcendental. The seeds of this development are clearly visible in 
German Neology. For this reason, one cannot equate Lockean 
Latitudinarianism with German Neology, in spite of several assump- 
tions made by both.22 All in all, Locke's religious ideas were well known 
by German theologians, but never found widespread acceptance outside 
the liberal neological movement. Religious liberalism was a minority 
movement in Germany, limited to a rather small group of theologians, 
and religious orthodoxy continued to rule the greater part of the popu- 
lation throughout the Enlightenment.23 
Locke's educational ideas, as expressed in his Some Thoughts Con- 
cerning Education (1693), were more readily accepted in Germany than 
his other theories. Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723-90), the founder of 
the liberal experimental school called the Dessau Philanthropinum, was 
an ardent follower of Locke. The same is true of Basedow's disciples, 
who are generally called the Philanthropinists. The last will and 
testament of the Philanthropinist movement was the great encyclo- 
pedia Allgemeine Revision des gesamten Schul-und Erziehungswesen 
von einer Gesellschaft praktischer Erzieher (16 vols., Hamburg, 1785- 
92). In this encyclopedia, to which most of the Philanthropinists 
contributed, Lockean ideas figure very prominently. The Phi- 
lanthropinist movement, however, was an evanescent phenomenon, 
limited very much in space and time. On account of its utilitarian and 
anti-classical temper it did not materially affect the course of German 
education. The mainstream of German educational thought, even at the 
height of the Philanthropinist movement, was neohumanism, as repre- 
sented by Gesner, Heyne, Ernesti, or Niethammer.24 Locke, to be sure, 
was admired for his good sense, his emphasis on doing and 
experiencing, and his observationalist method. At the same time, his 
one-sided utilitarianism, which at times amounted to rank philistinism, 
aroused much hostility and ultimately militated against Locke's 
widespread acceptance. The decline of Philanthropinism (Basedow's 
Philanthropinum collapsed in 1793) meant a corresponding diminution 
of interest in Locke. This diminishing interest in Locke's educational 
theories was greatly accelerated by the influx of Rousseauian ideas. The 
22This misconception is most persistently pursued by Andrew Brown, "John Locke 
and the Religious Aufklarung," Review of Religion (Jan. 1949), 126-54. 
23The literature in eighteenth-century theology is sizeable, but generally undistin- 
guished. Some of the better studies are: G. R. Cragg, From Puritanism to the Age of 
Reason (Cambridge, 1966) and The Church and the Age of Reason, 1648-1789 (New 
York, 1961); Karl Aner, Die Theologie der Lessingzeit (Hildesheim, 1961); F. W. 
Kantzenbach, Protestantisches Christentum im Zeitalter der Aufklarung (Gtfterloh, 
1965); and Wolfgang Philipp, Das Werden der Aufkldrung in theologiegeschichtlicher 
Sicht (1957). 
24For the role of education in eighteenth-century Germany: Karl Biedermann, 
Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1854-80); W. H. Bruford, Germany 
in the Eighteenth Century, The Social Background of the Literary Revival (Cambridge, 
1965); Oskar Lehmann, Die deutschen moralischen Wochenschriften des achtzehnten 
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last two decades of the eighteenth century in Germany were dominated 
by Rousseau, who overshadowed all other foreign philosophers, and did 
so both in the popularity and in the long-range impact of his ideas. 
For want of a better word, the men in Germany who came to the 
defense of Locke's philosophy may be called empiricists. The largest 
number of these Lockean admirers came from the University of Got- 
tingen, where sober positivism sustained most academic disciplines. 
The most prominent Gottingen empiricists were Johann Heinrich 
Feder (1740-1821) and Christoph Meiners (1747-1810). In addition, 
there were Gottlob August Tittel (1739-1816), and Johann Friedrich 
Flatt (1759-1821), who sympathized with the position of Feder and 
Meiners. Today, their names have been forgotten and their works 
gather dust in a few German university libraries. There is a good reason 
for this. These empiricists were not only shallow and unsystematic, but 
engaged in such a feebleminded opposition to Kant that they lost the 
support of the younger generation of German philosophers.25 The same 
fate befell other German empiricists, though some of them, most 
notably Dietrich Tiedemann (1748-1803) and Johann Nicolaus Tetens 
(1738-1807), have been treated more charitably by posterity. 
The striking thing about the German empiricists was their unusual 
philosophic orientation. Since they were all educated in the Leibniz- 
Wolff school of philosophy, they found it exceedingly difficult to accept 
English empiricism in its entirety. Most German empiricists did not, 
like their English or French counterparts, advance beyond Locke to a 
monistic interpretation of psychic phenomena. Except for such sensa- 
tionalists as Johann Christian Lossius (1743-1813) or Karl Franz von 
Irwing (1728-1801), they refused to wipe out the Lockean distinction 
between sensation and reflection. The mind, they held, was far more 
than a mere heap or collection of perceptions-a receptacle of discrete 
atoms, fortuitously combined by the laws of association. To be sure, 
they often used mechanical metaphors, but they remained loyal to the 
idealist conception of the soul as both container and producer of ideas. 
Behind their refusal to dispense with the reflective faculty in man lurked 
a deep-seated philosophic conscience inherited from Leibniz.26 Try as 
they might, the German empiricists could not abandon the Leibniz- 
Jahrhunderts als padagogische Reformschriften (Leipzig, 1893); Friedrich Paulsen, 
Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1896), and Das deutsche 
Bildungswesen in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1909). 
25This feeble-minded opposition to Kant is especially obvious in the Philosophische 
Bibliothek (1788-91), a philosophical journal founded and edited by Meiners and Feder. 
26It has not been sufficiently stressed that there was a Leibnizean Renaissance in the 
late 1760's and the 1770's, following the publication of Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais 
(1765). This Leibniz Renaissance was a very real and deeply-felt phenomenon, deter- 
mining the future course of German history. Cf. Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilo- 
sophie im Zeitalter der A uJkldrung, op. cit., 317ff. 
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Wolff model of a unifying, holistic, and creative soul. Indeed, they often 
criticized Locke for minimizing the dynamic role played by the mind in 
producing ideas. 
This stout-hearted defense of an autonomous soul was charac- 
teristic not only of German empiricism, but of German philosophy in 
general. Superficially, the history of German philosophy after 1750 ap- 
pears as a struggle between two one-sided views of the mind: the innate 
model of Leibniz and the cash-register model expounded by English and 
French sensationalists. Strictly speaking, this impression is false. Not 
even the German empiricists could endorse the materialistic view of the 
mind. Of course, the German empiricists rejected Leibniz's theory of 
the self-sufficient monad, which they unanimously regarded as 
scientifically untenable. The external world, they insisted, simply could 
not be separated from the ego, and consequently had to be allowed to 
participate in consciousness. Between the ego and the world there is a 
constant interrelationship. Yet this relationship-and here the German 
empiricists refused to follow their English counterparts-is not a one- 
sided affair, beginning and ending in sensation. Even if the material of 
thought is conveyed to the mind via the senses, it must still be reg- 
istered, compared, united, classified-in short, transformed-by the 
mind itself. In processing the data of the senses, the mind imposes its 
own character upon them; and in so doing, displays its autonomy and 
self-activity. 
We have here, by the German empiricists themselves, a 
reaffirmation of the rationalistic dictum that the senses must be in- 
tellectualized. In addition, we find that the German empiricists denied 
the converse, namely, that the intellect must be sensualized. Nothing is 
in the intellect, Locke had said, which has not previously been in the 
senses-to which Leibniz added the proviso "Except for the intellect it- 
self." This celebrated statement, along with the Leibnizean caveat, now 
assumed renewed significance. Granted that all of our knowledge 
begins with experience, granted, further, that it must justify itself in 
experiential terms-the fact still remains that it must be validated by 
certain innate faculties of the mind which are transcendent in 
character.27 
In their attempts to safeguard the spontaneous, autonomous, and, 
in a sense, the transcendental nature of the soul, while at the same time 
embracing the empiricist argument, the German empiricists clearly re- 
veal their ambiguous position. They wanted very much to be empiricists 
in the English tradition. They hoped to treat the mind according to 
strict empirical laws, as set forth in Locke's Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding or in Newton's Opticks. Yet, shuddering at the implied 
consequences-the example of David Hume's radical empiricism being 
ever present to their eyes-they recoiled to a variety of rationalistic 
27This active and creative dimension of the soul is especially emphasized by Tetens, 
as when he said that "die Seele kann nicht nur ihre Vorstellungen stellen und ordnen, 
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positions. We have the curious spectacle, then, of a number of German 
empiricists being attracted to English philosophy, while at the same 
time holding fast to German idealism. Not even Tetens, the supposed 
"German Locke," could accept English empiricism in its entirety, as 
his search for a "transcendental" knowledge reveals. In a key passage, 
Tetens epitomizes this unique position of German empiricism by saying 
that: 
The British philosophers may serve as a model in the field of empirical ob- 
servation, but certainly not in speculative philosophy.... It seems to me that 
our Leibniz has fathomed the human mind and its activities, especially in 
respect to transcendental knowledge, to a far greater degree of depth, ac- 
curacy, and clarity than the conscientious observationalist John Locke.28 
Locke was not only a philosopher, but a major political ideologue. 
In point of fact, he is commonly called the founder of modern 
liberalism, a theory which is supposed to have been social dynamite in 
Western Europe and America. Yet, in Germany his political philosophy 
was greeted with universal insouciance-both by those who sympa- 
thized with his general philosophic outlook and those who did not. 
What accounts for this widespread lack of interest in Locke's political 
philosophy? One way to account for it is to recall that the typical form 
of government in eighteenth-century Germany was royal absolutism. 
With few exceptions, political thinkers glorified the authoritarian struc- 
ture of society which prevailed everywhere. They owed their very 
existence to this order and consequently settled for a policy of splendid 
isolation as far as the world of politics was concerned. Intimidated by 
power, they preferred to study subjects which were not laden with 
political significance. The socio-economic context, then, explains in 
large part why they took so little interest in Locke's political writings. 
If any English political theorist commanded much respect in 
eighteenth-century Germany, it was Thomas Hobbes, not John Locke. 
We have seen that Locke exerted little influence in Germany until 
the mid-eighteenth century, when his theories were studied with 
renewed interest by the Popular Philosophers-by the Neologians, the 
Philanthropinists, and the German empiricists. But it cannot be main- 
tained, on that account, that the Popular Philosophers were Lockeans. 
Nor can it be maintained that renewed interest in Locke and English 
ideas turned most German philosophes into Anglomaniacs.29 It would 
wie der Aufseher iiber eine Gallerie die Bilder, sondern sie ist selbst Mahler und erfindet 
und verfertiget neue Gemalde." J. N. Tetens, Philosophische Versuche iiber die 
menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1777), 1, 107. 
28Tetens, Uber die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (Biitzow, 1775), 91. 
29The most serious offender in this respect is Peter Gay who, in his The Enlighten- 
ment, an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-69), overestimates the influence of 
English thinkers (Bacon, Newton, Locke) on the Enlightenment, and ignores the pro- 
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be foolish to deny that the German philosophes were interested in 
English cultural life. Apart from the Popular Philosophers, many first- 
rate minds, such as Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81), Martin Wie- 
land (1733-1813), Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-68), Moses 
Mendelssohn (1729-86), or Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), were inter- 
ested in England and studied the works of English thinkers. But to say 
that the German philosophes studied English life and thought, and to 
say that they were Anglomaniacs, defining their own Weltanschauung 
in terms of English modes of thought-these are two very different 
contentions. 
Locke's philosophy, which this essay takes as representative of 
English thought,30 never really left a very strong impression on the 
finest minds of the German Enlightenment. No one has ever seriously 
proposed that Winckelmann, Lessing, Wieland, Wolff, Mendelssohn, 
Euler, Lambert, or Kant were Lockeans. There is no evidence that 
Winckelmann ever read Locke or any other British empiricist. Insofar 
as he expressed philosophic convictions, he was idealistic and Platonic. 
Lessing and Wieland were greatly influenced by English literary 
models, but owed little to England for the sources of their world view. 
Lessing's Weltanschauung was Leibnizean, Wieland's was deeply 
rooted in ancient Stoicism and Epicureanism. The major German 
philosophers such as Mendelssohn, Euler, or Lambert, though placing 
greater emphasis on empirical elements in their systems, remained 
essentially loyal to the Leibniz-Wolff school. Even Tetens, the supposed 
"German Locke," was remarkably faithful to Leibniz-so much so, 
that he tried to devise a system in which Leibniz would be reconciled 
with English empiricism.3' 
IV. Except for some Popular Philosophers, there were few full- 
blooded Lockeans, just as there were few Anglomaniacs. Too many 
cultural barriers militated against the reception of English modes of 
thought, customs, and traditions. In the first place, Germany was wed- 
ded to French culture in such a way as to make intensive concern with 
English ideas very difficult.32 Throughout most of the eighteenth 
found persistence of such other national traditions as that of the German Enlighten- 
ment led by Leibniz. 
30Leslie Stephen writes that "Locke strikes, in all subjects of which he treats, the 
keynote of English speculation in the eighteenth century." Leslie Stephen, History of 
English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., 79. 
31This view is also shared by Wilhelm Uebele, who sees Tetens as a mediator be- 
tween Leibniz and Locke. Wilhelm Uebele, Johann Nicolaus Tetens nach seiner 
Gesamtentwicklung betrachtet, mit besonderer Berucksichtigung des Verhiltnisses zu 
Kant (Berlin, 1912), 211. 
32For the continued predominance of French culture in Germany: Karl Bieder- 
mann, Deutschland im Achtzehnten Jahrhundert, 2 vols. in 3 (Leipzig, 1854-80); 
Werner Kraus, ed., Die Franz6sische Aufklarung im Spiegel der Deutschen Literatur 
des 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin, 1963); Betina Strauss, La Culture francaise c Francfort 
au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1914); and Eduard Wechssler, "Die Auseinandersetzung des 
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century French intellectual and institutional traditions predominated in 
Germany. In government and administration French influence 
continued unabated until the Revolution of 1789. Many travellers to 
Germany were struck by this pervasiveness of French customs. 
Governments, for example, were little more than French Versailles in 
miniature. Prussia under Frederick the Great was perhaps the most ex- 
treme case. The Prussian monarch was imbued with French culture and 
surrounded himself with French advisers, litterateurs, and even tax 
farmers. He spoke German, as he admitted proudly, only in the manner 
of a coachman. His dislike of the German language was so strong that, 
according to one authority, he would not suffer a single German book 
to be placed in his library.33 Frederick's Academie des Sciences was 
dominated by the French, and the monarch took it as a compliment 
when D'Alembert informed him that "Heureusement, Sire, votre Aca- 
demie des Sciences ne resemble pas au reste de la nation."34 
Admittedly, Frederick's glorification of French civilization was not 
equalled elsewhere in Germany. But the Prussian monarch was no ex- 
ception in preferring French customs and traditions. These were as 
fervently studied and imitated as they were in the seventeenth century. 
Christian Thomasius, often called the father of the German Enlighten- 
ment, urged his fellow Germans as early as 1687 to become more civi- 
lized by imitating French manners.35 His recommendation was 
repeated by many other illustrious Germans, most notably by the 
classicist Gottsched, who epitomized current feelings by his famous 
remark, "What the Greeks were to the Romans, the French are to 
us."36 
Between English and German modes of thought, therefore, stood 
the sum of French ideas which Germany had inherited from the seven- 
teenth century-the period of her greatest dependence on France. The 
most visible sign of this influence, apart from the factors already men- 
tioned, was the predominance of the French language. This accounts, in 
no small measure, for the popularity of French literature in Germany. 
Leipzig book catalogues reveal that French titles were as numerous as 
German ones. Newly published French books were generally translated 
into German during the very year they appeared in French print.37 
Now the impact of French culture revealed itself in two directions: 
deutschen Geistes mit der franz6sischen Aufklarung," Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift 
fir Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, I, 613-35. 
33Biedermann, Deutschland im Achzehnten Jahrhundert, II, 236. 
34Adolf Harnack, Geschichte der Koniglich Preussischen Akademie, I, 362. 
35Discurs, welcher Gestalt man denen Franzosen im gemeinen Leben und Wandel 
nachahmen solle. 
36Quoted by Albert K6ster, Die deutsche Literatur der Aufklarungszeit 
(Heidelberg, 1925), 10. 
37Werner Kraus, ed., Die Franzosische Aufklrung im Spiegel der deutschen 
Literatur des 18. Jahrhunderts, CXXXIII. 
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in a rationalistic philosophy and a classicistic literature. Both tenden- 
cies, reinforced by native traditions, dominated German cultural life 
until at least 1760. The reactions against these movements in the 1770's 
was largely nationalistic and owed little, except, perhaps, in literature, 
to English modes of thought.38 
French rationalism, which found a favorable reception in Germany, 
was not very conducive to Lockean empiricism. There is no doubt that 
Descartes enjoyed far greater prestige than Locke in Germany during 
the first half of the century. The man who introduced Cartesianism into 
Germany was Christian Wolff. The complementary nature of 
Wolffianism and Cartesianism has been much neglected.39 Both agreed 
that sense experience represents a lower form of knowledge, that emo- 
tional states distort conceptual thought, and that the mathematical 
method must be made the touchstone of philosophic certainty. Both 
tended, in addition, to denigrate the kind of experimental science which 
begins with individual facts and rises, by degrees, to general concepts 
and axioms. Instead, they favored a priori constructions to which facts 
were assumed to conform. 
Several other factors commended Descartes to the Wolffians. His 
defense of innate ideas against nominalism and sense experience fitted 
in well with German school philosophy. The same was true, though to a 
lesser extent, of the mind-body dualism and the rationalistic form of 
theology. However, Descartes' mechanism enjoyed far less popularity, 
owing to the fact that modern science replaced the qualitative medieval 
ideology of science later in Germany than elsewhere in Europe.40 This 
explains why French materialism, as expounded by Holbach or La 
Mettrie, was regarded in Germany with unmitigated horror. 
A far more persistent stumbling block against English thought was 
the national element in German philosophy. Two things, often comple- 
mentary, checked the growth of Locke and English empiricism: the 
first was the multi-dimensional philosophy of Leibniz; the second, the 
mystical-idealistic strain in German thought. 
The philosophy of Leibniz owed its strength to the way in which it 
affected the German mind in the eighteenth century. During the first 
half of the century it appeared in all its scholastic splendor, thanks to 
the efforts of Wolff. When Wolff's influence declined, and Lockean em- 
piricism penetrated Germany, the other part of Leibniz's philosophy 
38Those who turned against French rationalism in the 1770's, the so-called Sturmer 
und Dranger, found much support in English writers: Percy, Ossian, Milton, Young, 
and Shakespeare. In no way, however, can it be argued that these English writers 
precipitated the movement known as Sturm und Drang. 
39This subject is briefly touched upon by Robert Sommer, who also notes the simi- 
larity between Descartes and Wolff. Robert Sommer, Grundziige einer Geschichte der 
Deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik, von Wolff-Baumgarten bis Kant-Schiller 
(Wtirzburg, 1892), 6ff. 
40Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy, op. cit., 182. 
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rose to the surface. This was the dynamic, evolutionary aspect of 
Leibniz, so long ignored by Wolff. Thus, when Wolff's prestige waned, 
Leibniz's philosophy was essentially unaffected. In 1765 Leibniz's 
Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain was published for the first 
time. It came at a most opportune moment. Being a subtle point by 
point refutation of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
it did much to check the incipient growth of Lockean empiricism. The 
result of this Leibnizean Renaissance was that very few German 
philosophers subscribed to the varieties of English empiricism. The so- 
called German empiricists-Feder, Irwing, Tiedemann, or Tetens-are 
almost unknown today. 
There is an additional consequence of the Nouveaux Essais which 
has not received sufficient notice, and that is its impact on German 
literature. When abstract rationalism broke down in the 1760's, it was 
largely owing to the influence of Leibniz. Leibniz revitalized German 
literature by stressing the unconscious elements of the soul and by 
denying the Wolffian dictum that experience and reason are different 
sources of knowledge. Thus the liberation of sensuality in German 
literature owes as much to Leibniz as to foreign sources (Rousseau, 
Diderot, Locke). Foreign influences merely reinforced a movement 
which had developed on native German soil (Leibniz, Pietism, 
Empfindsamkeit). 
Leibniz was, of course, only part of a tradition in German thought 
dating back to Paracelsus and Meister Eckhart, the mystical-idealistic 
tradition, which neither scholasticism nor modern physical science 
could suppress. When Newtonian science, of which Locke was the 
philosophic spokesman, appeared to conquer all other modes of 
thought, the idealistic tendency in Germany gained a new lease on life. 
Its chief task in the eighteenth century was to develop a qualitative 
ideology of science so that belief in the spiritual elements in man and 
nature could be preserved.41 Most German philosophers were appalled 
by the mechanistic view of science because it threatened to reduce man 
to little more than a machine. When Goethe and his fellow students 
read Holbach's Systeme de la nature, they were struck by its morbid- 
ness and "shivered in the manner of those who are frightened by 
ghosts."42 
Goethe comes at the end of the Enlightenment and typifies the 
resentment in Germany against the Newtonian universe. Against the 
conception of nature as lifeless and inert he opposed a spiritualistic and 
vitalistic view. His inspiration was the evolutionary aspect of Leibniz's 
philosophy. Nature, to Leibniz, was one vast organism, teeming with vi- 
tality and life. Nature must be conceived in its evolution, in its ceaseless 
4'For the qualitative ideology of science in the Enlightenment: Charles C. Gillispie, 
The Edge of Objectivity, An Essay in the History of Scientific Ideas (Princeton, 1960). 
42Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, op., cit., Bk. 11. 
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growth, and in its development from potentiality to actuality. The idea 
that the present is pregnant with the future (charge du passe et gros de 
l'avenir) had very fruitful consequences in such fields as history, 
biology, literature, and art. 
Apart from being vital or dynamic, nature is also spiritual; and as 
such, it contains a purpose that transcends mere matter of factness. 
Here is already the germ of Romanticism, and it is present in the very 
heart of Enlightenment philosophy. 
In the final analysis, then, there was a powerful spiritualistic move- 
ment in German philosophy which stubbornly resisted the encroach- 
ments to British empiricism. This movement spiritualized nature, 
endowed the human soul with autonomous spontaneity, affirmed 
reason as the highest source of knowledge, and valued intuition more 
than common sense. 
V. By drawing attention to the influence of Locke's thought on the 
German Enlightenment where it actually existed, and by indicating the 
kind of obstacles it encountered, this essay has, I hope, put Locke's his- 
torical importance in proper perspective. Whatever his influence was in 
England or France, it was negligible in Germany. His philosophic im- 
pact on the German Enlightenment was always limited by native tradi- 
tions inimical to his thought. His ideas could not compete with the 
Leibniz-Wolff system in which all German philosophers, including the 
Lockean sympathizers, were educated. It is true that around mid- 
century and beyond Locke attracted a certain following, but those who 
accepted his theories were minor figures and exercised very little 
influence on the future course of German philosophy. 
Locke was slightly more fortunate in his religious and educational 
theories, though, here again, native traditions always exercised a strong 
counterpoise. His educational and religious ideas were accepted to the 
extent that they harmonized with local developments. When they did, 
as in the case of some German Neologians and Philantropinists, the 
problem arises whether they directly influenced the men in question or 
merely reinforced what was already present. Of all the Popular 
Philosophers, only Steinbart, Basedow, Feder, Meiners, and Tittel were 
under the direct spell of Locke-hardly a very impressive group of 
thinkers. 
What, then, remains of the claim that Locke's influence pervaded 
the eighteenth century with a kind of scriptural authority? Obviously, in 
the light of what has been said, this judgment cannot be seriously main- 
tained in the case of Germany. No one denies that Locke was well- 
known and widely read in Germany. Being a major European 
philosopher, how could it be otherwise? But that he materially affected 
the direction of German thought, both in the Age of Enlightenment and 
beyond, is a claim that will not hold up under close historical scrutiny. 
Chapman College. 
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